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ABSTRACT. A growing literature seeks to explore the factors shaping adaptation to climate change. In collectively managed common
pool resource systems, there is often a tension between behavior that benefits the individual and actions that benefit a larger group.
Resource users in sustainable systems must therefore work together to ensure outcomes that are beneficial to the group as a whole.
However, in the face of changing social, political, and environmental conditions, community norms may change, leading to the emerging
of new behavioral patterns. Understanding when and why people decide to act in ways that benefit the group as a whole can help policy
makers better target policies or change incentives to promote desired outcomes. This research seeks to build on research in common
pool resource management and multilevel selection to understand how and why collective pressures shape individual adaptation
behavior. Using qualitative data from in-depth interviews of farmers in Sri Lanka, this study confirms that collective management
practices in Sri Lankan irrigation systems significantly influence farmer’s potential adaption behaviors. Based on farmer’s explanations
of their own behavior, we hypothesize that farmer’s belief  in the ecological necessity of cooperation and explicit government support
for collective action are important drivers of collective action. Given the influence of community rules and norms, we conclude that
efforts at adaptation are more likely to be successful if  they target farmer organizations and communities as a whole rather than
individual farmers.
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INTRODUCTION
In the face of climate change, academics and policy makers are
concerned with how to promote adaptation in agricultural
systems to protect food, water, and livelihood security. Adaptive
behavior is shaped by policies and norms at various scales, ranging
from the household level to national and international bodies
(Cash et al. 2006). If  we are to design effective policies and
programs to support agricultural adaptation, it is necessary to
understand the various forces that facilitate or constrain the
decisions and actions of farmers around the world.  
In this paper, we focus specifically on the factors shaping decision
making in small, collectively managed irrigations systems in Sri
Lanka. Community-managed resources such as forests, fisheries,
and irrigation systems support the livelihoods of people around
the world. It has been well established that the successful
management of irrigation systems often requires high degrees of
coordination (Ostrom 1993, Sarker and Itoh 2001, Trawick 2001).
In order for water to be efficiently managed and delivered, such
coordination must take place at levels appropriate for the size of
the system in question, for example, at the level of the reservoir,
the level of the distribution canal, and the field canal level in larger
systems (Uphoff et al. 1990). In Sri Lanka alone, there are over
11,000 small-scale, farmer-managed irrigation schemes (Shah et
al. 2013). Often communities have managed collective resources
for generations; yet, as social, political, and economic conditions
change, so do the incentives shaping individual and collective
behavior. Changing contexts have the potential to erode or alter
cultural norms and collaborative institutions in ways that can
impact both resource management and adaptive capacity (Wilson
et al. 2013, Waring et al. 2015). Warring et al. (2015) demonstrated
in the context of Fijian fishing communities that the transition
from fishing for local or subsistence use to selling to global
markets contributed to overfishing by eroding cultural norms that
promoted sustainable resource use. Other work has demonstrated
that demographic changes, such as urbanization and population
growth, can undermine the effectiveness of collective resource
institutions (Cox and Ross 2011).  
These examples raise questions of how cultural norms and
institutions evolve in response to changing contexts. To devise
effective policy, decision makers must understand the social,
economic, and cultural factors that most influence individual
decision making, how these forces interact, and the scales at which
they operate (Cash et al. 2006, Brewer 2015, Waring et al. 2015,
Waring and Tremblay 2016). However, little is known about
precisely when, why, and how cooperation prevails over
individualistic behavior (Waring et al. 2015). This analysis seeks
to integrate insights from the common pool resource (CPR) and
cultural multilevel selection (CMLS) literature, and responds to
calls for case studies that can help elaborate a more robust theory
of adaptation behavior.  
Case studies are particularly useful in understanding the
development and persistence of cooperative behavior because
they provide an in-depth understanding of why people behave as
they do (Brewer 2015, Waring and Tremblay 2016). By examining
how people understand their own decisions, we can gain
important insights into community dynamics (Brewer 2015) that
might help policy makers design effective, context-relevant
adaptation policies (Waring and Tremblay 2016). Drawing on this
approach, we address the following research questions:  
1. How do farmers themselves understand the pressures they
face? 
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2. Which scale of decision making, individual or collective, is
dominant in small-scale irrigation systems in Sri Lanka
today? Do collective norms and practices prevail over
individual decisions in modern times? 
3. What are the implications of the answers to research
questions one and two for adaptation policy? 
We draw on the literature on common pool resource management
and cultural evolution, both of which have significant
implications for the design and implementation of climate change
adaptation initiatives. Both recognize that the fitness of the group
is dependent upon individuals foregoing individual benefits in
favor of behavior that benefits the group as a whole (Olson 1965,
Williams 1966, Hardin 1968, Ostrom 1990, Adger 2003). The CPR
literature describe these tensions in terms of free-riders,
individuals who benefits from a resource without sufficiently
contributing to its management or maintenance. If  the majority
of resource users act in the best interest of the group, the impact
of the free-riders may be minimal (Ostrom and Gardner 1993).
However, many delinquent users eventually lead to resource or
system degradation and the tragedy of the commons (Hardin
1968). Despite the potential for tragedy, Ostrom (1990, 1993)
identified eight “design principles” that have proven critical for
the successful management of long-enduring, common pool
resources, including collectively managed irrigation systems.  
Modern scholars of cultural evolution in general, and CMLS in
particular, have developed a complementary line of research that
seeks to explain and predict when individuals will collaborate and
when they will act in their own self-interest (Traulsen and Nowak
2006, Waring et al. 2015, Waring and Tremblay 2016).
Evolutionary models show that when multiple groups compete
against one another for survival in the same environment, groups
that cooperate are more likely to survive and multiply (Traulsen
and Nowak 2006). Waring et al. (2015) hypothesize that when
tensions exist between individual and group selection, “the social
scale of an environmental dilemma determines the spread of a
cooperative trait” (Waring et al. 2015:Fig. 2). CMLS theory builds
upon the idea that evolutionary selection works at the individual
and group levels, hypothesizing that over-time groups that
develop effective cultural mechanisms for ensuring cooperation
will be more likely to survive and multiply than groups of more
self-interested individuals (Waring et al. 2015, Richerson et al.
2016). The CMLS framework can be used to generate hypotheses
about sustainable practices, to explore how sustainable practices
evolve, and to understand how and why they persist (Waring et
al. 2015).  
First, we examine how resource users in a modern common-pool
resource system have responded to changing social, political, and
economic pressures and identify how individual and collective
considerations influence farmer decisions. We conclude that,
unlike what Waring et al. (2015) found in Fiji, marketization,
mechanization and other forces associated with colonization and
modernization have changed how farmers cultivate, e.g., how
much land is farmed and the techniques used, but that collective
norms historically associated with paddy cultivation practices
remain strong.  
Second, the depth of our qualitative data allows us to hypothesize
about why collective norms have persisted. In doing so, we
respond to calls to develop hypotheses about the factors
influencing whether individual or group selection will dominate
decision making in a given context (Waring and Tremblay 2016).
Based on our informants’ accounts of the factors influencing their
decision making, we hypothesize that explicit recognition of and
belief  in the ecological (and hence economic) consequences of
defection and government support for collective action have
contributed to continued collaboration in the face of social,
political, and economic change.  
We demonstrate how insights from CMLS analyses can be useful
for adaptation policy makers. Despite increasing acknowledgment
of the role individual or group incentives may play in shaping
adaptive behavior (Waring and Tremblay 2016), our research
team’s experience in Sri Lanka suggests that on-the-ground
adaptation in Sri Lanka is often targeted at individual farmers
(Villholth and Rajasooriyar 2010). For example, government
institutions promote a variety of practices, e.g., crop
diversification or hybrid seed varieties, to encourage resilience to
water scarcity and other climate-related shocks. Yet, these efforts
(in the form is pamphlets and farmer training programs) often
target individual farmers rather than encourage collective shifts
toward such practices. We therefore elaborate on the policy
implications of group selection pressures and community
dynamics that we observed, concluding that adaptations targeted
at the community as a whole are more likely to be effective.
BACKGROUND
Climate change adaptation and adaptation strategies
A growing body of literature explores the importance of
community and individual strategies to adapt to climate change.
This includes responses that are adopted autonomously by
households as well as those promoted through governmental or
nongovernmental institutions. Adaptive strategies in agricultural
systems may include crop and livelihood diversification
(Kurukulasuriya and Mendelsohn 2008, Wassmann et al. 2009,
Dasinaa and Sugirtharan 2017), the introduction of agricultural
insurance schemes (Wassmann et al. 2009, Varela-Ortega et al.
2016, Dasinaa and Sugirtharan 2017), or the use or promotion
of indigenous and technical knowledge (Wassmann et al. 2009).
In water-scarce regions such as the Sri Lankan dry zone,
adaptations include increasing reservoir capacity and water-use
efficiency through water harvesting and practices that conserve
soil moisture in dry areas or prevent soil erosion and water logging
in wet areas (Wassmann et al. 2009, Babel et al. 2011, Varela-
Ortega et al. 2016). Paddy-specific adaptations include choosing
paddy varieties that are better suited to the new climate
(Wassmann et al. 2009, Babel et al. 2011, Varela-Ortega et al.
2016, Dasinaa and Sugirtharan 2017), changing planting and
harvesting schedules (Babel et al. 2011, Banerjee et al. 2016,
Shrestha et al. 2016, Dasinaa and Sugirtharan 2017),
transplanting seedlings (Banerjee et al. 2016), alternate wetting
and drying of paddy to reduce irrigation water requirements
(Rejesus et al. 2011, Dasinaa and Sugirtharan 2017), and
improving pest and disease management through integrated pest
management and the selection of disease and pest resistant
varieties (Wassmann et al. 2009).  
The Sri Lankan Government acknowledges that agricultural
adaptation has the potential to significantly reduce the impact of
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Table 1. Applicability of Ostrom’s (1990, 1993) design principles to historic patterns in Sri Lankan minor irrigation systems.
 
Design principle Historical characteristics of Sri Lankan minor irrigation systems
1. Clearly defined boundaries These systems had clearly defined boundaries (Guneratne 1985, Abeyratne and Perera 1986)
2. Proportional equivalence between costs and
benefits
Land holders were obligated to contribute labor for collective works in proportion to the amount of
land they held (Leach 1961, Dayton-Johnson 2003).
3. Collective-choice agreements At the beginning of every cultivation season, farmers participated in creating the rules governing
planting, water releases, system maintenance, monitoring, and sanctions (Somasiri 2008, Jinapala et
al. 2010).
4. Monitoring Communities had mechanisms for monitoring adherence to the rules (Leach 1961).
5. Graduated sanctions Communities settled disputes through village tribunals and regional courts (Leach 1961).
6. Conflict resolution mechanisms Community members resolved disputes among themselves (Mohottala Gedara 2011).
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize According to Leach (1959) ruling elites did not interfere with management of the village tanks.
8. Nested enterprises This was irrelevant in a more decentralized time, when state authorities did not interfere in village
affairs (Leach 1959).
Source: Adapted from Ostrom (1993).
climate change on farmer livelihoods (Reidsma et al. 2010,
Shrestha et al. 2016). Mitigating the impacts of climate change
on agriculture is one of six strategic priorities outlined in the
National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (Government of
Sri Lanka, 2010a). Recent government reports advocate research
for and the promotion of traditional, indigenous rice varieties,
noting that widely used “improved,” imported varieties that
promise higher yields are more susceptible to pests and diseases,
require more agricultural inputs, and are not well adapted to local
climate conditions (Government of Sri Lanka 2010b). Sri Lankan
policy makers advocate crop diversification and the cultivation
of less water-intensive, nonpaddy crops such as chilies, onions,
and soy to reduce water demand. In addition, the government
acknowledges the need for environmental protection and
conservation through the prevention of land degradation, soil
conservation, and a reduction of chemical fertilizer and pesticide
use. Finally, the government promotes the conservation of
indigenous knowledge of Sri Lanka’s unique agro-ecology and
climate because it believes such knowledge will be useful in
adapting to climate change (Government of Sri Lanka 2010b).
Study site
In Sri Lanka, rice (paddy) cultivation has been the bedrock of
economic, social, and cultural practice since before 67 CE (Peebles
2006). Paddy cultivation in Sri Lanka takes place during one or
both of two distinct monsoons seasons, the maha and yala. The
maha rains last from October to December and bring nearly 75%
of annual rainfall to the island (Senaratne and Scarborough
2011). The spatial distribution of rainfall divides the island into
three agro-ecological zones: the dry zone, intermediate zone, and
wet zone (Lyon et al. 2009). Today, nearly three quarters of Sri
Lanka’s paddy production is concentrated in the intermediate and
dry zones (De Silva et al. 2007) where irrigation is essential to
farmers’ ability to cultivate in both the yala and maha seasons.
The dry zone is therefore covered with both major and minor
systems. In minor systems, precipitation is captured in rain-fed
tanks and distributed through a system of dug canals maintained
by the water users (Panabokke et al. 2002), and in major systems
water is diverted from the nation’s largest river through a series
of state-managed reservoirs and canals. Although the government
has invested heavily in the development of major irrigation
systems since the 1960s, there are still over 11,000 minor systems
covering the island (Shah et al. 2013). Successful, multiscalar
agricultural adaptation will be essential across systems to
maintain food and water security and support local agricultural
livelihoods.
Sri Lankan minor tank systems as common pool resource systems
A great deal has been written about irrigation systems as common
pool resources (CPRs) and about the conditions under which
collectively managed CPR systems are most likely to ensure
sustainable resource management (Freeman 1990, Ostrom 1993,
Sarker and Itoh 2001, Trawick 2001, Bardhan and Dayton-
Johnson 2002, Bastakoti and Shivakoti 2009, Madani and Dinar
2012). As summarized in Table 1, scholars historically described
small-scale irrigation systems in Sri Lanka in ways that are
consonant with Ostrom’s design principles. Canals leaving the
tank irrigate long thin plots of land that run parallel to the tank
bund, the earthen structure that retains the water (see Fig. 1).
Each farming family received a parcel of land in the head-,
middle-, and tail-end of the tank’s command area, promoting
equity in access to the shared water supply (Leach 1961).
Fig. 1. Layout of minor village irrigation system.
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Allocating the easily irrigated head-end land to all families in the
community ensured that everyone would be able to cultivate in
times of water scarcity. During times of extreme water scarcity,
farmers engage in a practice called bethma (Leach 1961,
Thiruchelvam 2010), in which the area of land cultivated was
reduced and reallocated among farmers based on their land
holdings to ensure that everyone was able to cultivate (Somasiri
2008).
Changing systems
Sri Lanka has undergone significant social, political, and
economic changes, which have the potential to erode or support
community institutions and lead to more individualistic behavior.
For example, a number of colonial and postindependence policies
have gradually given the government greater influence over
management of irrigation of minor systems, land tenure and
cultivation, and the crops cultivated. Since WWI, the government
has enacted several policies to ensure that Sri Lanka is self-
sufficient in paddy production (Anderson et al. 1991, Ariyabandu
2008) including laws that forbade farmers from growing crops
other than rice (Yamane 2009). In the late 1950s, the Department
of Agrarian Development began to oversee maintenance of small
tanks and management activities, such as the holding of
preseasonal farmer meetings, which dictated the timing of paddy
cultivation, soil conservation practices meetings (preseasonal
farmer meetings), and paddy cultivation timing and soil
conservation practices, discussed at greater length below
(Dunham 1982).  
In addition to policy changes, famers have gradually adopted
modern agricultural technologies such as non-native seeds,
mechanized equipment, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides. The
Green Revolution brought the development of short-duration
rice varieties, which allowed farmers to shorten the maha 
cultivation season by a month (Anderson et al. 1991). It also
brought fertilizer, introducing the need for credit. Beginning with
the Paddy Lands Act of 1958, the government encouraged the
use of chemical fertilizers by mandating that a proportion of the
price paid to farmers for their rice be paid in fertilizers and other
farm inputs (Anderson et al. 1991, Weerahewa et al. 2010).
Widespread access to fertilizer likely obviated, at least seemingly,
the use of cow manure, land fallowing, or other traditional
practices aimed at replenishing the soil. In 1958, a quarter of the
paddy land was given synthetic fertilizer. By 1968, 100% of paddy
land was chemically fertilized (Anderson et al. 1991).
METHODS
This analysis emerged from a larger NSF-funded interdisciplinary
research collaboration that examines various aspects of climate
change adaptation, agricultural practices, and water scarcity in
Sri Lanka’s dry zone. Although the results presented here draw
primarily on interview data from 39 individuals in 30 households
in a single minor-tank village in the Anuradhapura region, the
analysis and results were corroborated by interviews with officials
at the national, regional, and local levels, as well as data from
interviews with over 150 other major and minor system farmers
conducted between 2013 and 2017. The village was selected as a
representative case (Seawright and Gerring 2008, Yin 2013) in
consultation with local research partners. Like many minor tank
systems under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian
Development in Sri Lanka, it is a long-standing, majority
Sinhalese minor tank system community that has operated as a
community-managed irrigation system for decades, if  not
centuries.  
We analyzed the primary factors individual farmers described as
influencing their individual and household decision making using
data from in-depth interviews and participant observation. Data
were collected between August and November of 2015, a period
after the dry season (yala) harvest when communities are planning
for the upcoming maha wet season. A team of four researchers
(the first author and three Sri Lankan research assistants),
conducted semistructured interviews in one major and one minor
irrigation system in Anuradhapura District. The interview
questions and protocol were derived from the livelihoods as
intimate governance (LIG) approach to livelihood analysis (Carr
2014), a methodology designed to unpack the factors that shape
individual’s livelihood decisions.  
In 2015, the team interviewed the two local government officials
responsible for system management, the system’s extension
officer, and farmers from 30 of the 71 farming households in the
minor village. We also conducted a focus group of major and
minor system farmers together to explicitly capture perceived
differences between small and large irrigation systems.  
For several months in 2015, the team lived in an adjacent farming
community, traveling to and from the minor village to interview,
observe, and interact with farmers. Participant observation
consisted of accompanying farmers to their fields, attending the
seasonal meeting, and observing seasonal tank and canal
maintenance. The team conducted the interviews in Sinhala and
research assistants translated the questions and answers into
English. Because farmers were reluctant to have their interviews
recorded, team members took notes throughout the interview and
consulted in the evenings to create transcripts of the translations.
Any quotations are based on direct translations by the
interpreters, and farmers are identified by their confidential
interview numbers.  
Because the LIG method is designed to elicit an understanding
of how different groups within a community make decisions, each
farmer was asked a series of similar questions about their family
history, agricultural practices, and any other livelihoods they
practice or had practiced in the past. We attempted to understand
what farmers “typically” do, asking about specific years in which
water was known to be plentiful or scarce to elicit how water
scarcity might influence decision making. Each interview was
conducted with the primary agricultural decision maker in the
household, though often other family members were present and
contributed to the discussion (22 of the interviews were primarily
with men, in 4 interviews the husband and wife participated
equally, 4 interviews were with female famers, and in 2 interviews
multiple generations of the same family contributed). At each
stage, the team attempted to elicit why farmers made the decisions
they did, especially when an individual expressed a unique
preference or choice. By asking individuals for the rationale
behind their choices, patterns of opportunity and constraint
emerged, revealing the dominant contextual forces that influence
farmer decision making. Both during and after data collection,
the team coded the qualitative data for demographic information
as well as differences and similarities in livelihood practices and
themes relevant to livelihood decision making.  
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Table 2. Ostrom’s (1990, 1993) design principles in today’s minor systems.
 
Design principle Evidence of persistent collective action
1. Clearly defined boundaries Those allowed to plant in the system are outlined in farmer organization (FO) documents. The list of
farmers is based upon a village deed outlining ancestral ownership of the land, as formalized by the British
during colonial times (INT 1, 2, 3, Local government official).
2. Proportional equivalence between costs
and benefits
“Labor [for tank preparation and bund maintenance] is divided proportionately to the land owned” (Local
government official).
3. Collective-choice agreements These exist, but are heavily influenced by government officials. When asked how they decided what seeds to
plant and when, most of the farmers recounted some version of “the kupanisa [government representative
from the Department of Agrarian Development] organizes the precultivation meeting, in which all the
decisions are made, and then farmers follow them” (INT 11).
4. Monitoring Community members monitor each other with assistance from the kupanisa as necessary (Local
government official).
5. Graduated sanctions Sanctions are outlined in the seasonal contract and are imposed either by farmer organization officials or
by the government official charged with enforcing the rules (Local government official).
6. Conflict resolution mechanisms In case of conflict or misbehavior, tract representatives first attempt to resolve disputes, escalating to the
kupanisa as necessary (Local government official). Elected FO presidents, secretaries, and tract
representatives are responsible for reminding people to pay their FO dues and perform their portion of
bund cleaning and canal and tank maintenance, as well as overseeing water allocation and attempting to
resolve any conflicts over water management (INT 1, 2, 3). The kupanisa has the final authority to punish
people through fines or withholding water when they do not comply with the rules (Local government
official).
7. Minimal recognition of rights to
organize
Farmer organizations are recognized by the government, which works closely with those organizations to
set seasonal rules (Local government official; INT 1, 2, 3).
8. Nested enterprises If  unable to resolve problems themselves, farmers can also escalate complaints to local government
officials (INT 1, 20, 35, 36; Local government official).
Because of the cultural necessity of going through official
channels, introductions to households were done in collaboration
with officials from the farmer organization, an elected community
body charged with overseeing preliminary enforcement of
seasonal cultivation rules, and were based upon farmer
availability during the time of our interviews. Close collaboration
with local officials made it difficult to guarantee unbiased
sampling; nevertheless, the team emphasized the need to speak to
farmers representing the full-range of livelihood circumstances.
We found that respondents, regardless of their age, gender, or
apparent social class provided similar explanations of the nature
of collective constraints to individual behavior. Because of the
focus on collective constraints rather than intra-community
differences in decision making, the inability to ensure a
representative sample is unlikely to affect the results presented
here. Finally, in 2017, the research team conducted an additional
7 interviews with 15 national-level officials involved in decisions
related to farmer organization management, agricultural policy,
and water management to ascertain how the degree to which the
patterns observed below were representative of other minor
systems.
RESULTS
Which level of selection dominates?
In this section we present our evidence regarding the level,
individual or community, at which selection is strongest. Despite
the many social, economic, and political changes that have taken
place in Sri Lanka, there was overwhelming evidence that
collective selection pressures remain intact. Ostrom’s seventh
design principle suggests that government interference with
community organization and management of a resource may
undermine collective management. We found that government
interference has not eroded norms pertaining to crop selection
and the timing of agricultural activities. Government interference
in tank maintenance, however, appears to have had a negative
influence on community member’s willingness to maintain tank
infrastructure. Table 2 summarizes the extent to which Ostrom’s
design principles and principles of collective action remain
dominant today.  
The farmers we interviewed described farming governance
systems that retain many of the qualities of traditional minor
irrigation systems, but with significant influence of government
authorities over decision-making processes. According to
government informants across the country, the management of
minor systems is overseen by a combination of government
officers and elected community officials who head the community
farmer organization (FO). In minor systems, there is one FO per
reservoir. All farmers in the community are generally members
because government fertilizer subsidies and other services are
distributed through FOs, effectively mandating membership.
Before each season, members of the FO meet for precultivation
and seasonal meetings in which they work with local officials to
draft a management plan for the upcoming season. The rules and
decisions outlined at the seasonal meetings include everything
from the timing of water releases to farmer obligations to
contribute to tank and bund maintenance, building fences to keep
cattle out of the paddy fields, and organization to protect the
fields from elephants. Once ratified by all the farmers and the
kupanisa, a government representative from the Department of
Agrarian Development (DAD) who is responsible for overseeing
tank operations, the decisions taken at these meetings are legally
binding. Violators may be fined, have water withheld, or may be
otherwise punished as per the community rules.  
According to official and farmer accounts, government experts
use the seasonal meetings as a space to recommend and harmonize
the use of specific seed varieties and management practices. The
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meetings are an opportunity for government experts to make crop
and calendar recommendations for the upcoming season based
upon water availability, pest control, and other factors. Farmers
may make adjustments based upon their field characteristics and
when exactly they are able to start cultivating, but for the most
part they heed the recommendations of local authorities.  
Our interviews indicated that farmers in minor systems only break
with seasonal meeting guidelines in times of duress. According to
farmers, illness or other personal and financial hardships
impeding their ability to prepare land or obtain seeds, fertilizer,
and other inputs were the only reasons they would not begin
cultivation with their neighbors. Farmers call such delays “late
cultivation” and although it may not be “a big issue in the maha 
season, as there is enough [rain] water, if  this happens in yala,
their harvest reduces. Therefore, they always try to go with the
decisions in the seasonal meeting, especially in yala” (INT 27).
Tank maintenance: a breakdown in collective action
Water scarcity and the condition of infrastructure were the most
commonly cited problems among farmers. According to both
farmers and officials, poor infrastructural conditions are largely
the result of disputed responsibilities for tank infrastructure.
Farmers and officials each believe the other should do more to
contribute toward infrastructure maintenance, a situation that
negatively affects any attempts to reduce water losses due to
declining infrastructure. Farmers pay into a FO fund each month
and want that money to be used to address problems the
community deems important. As noted by a local official, “one
of the reasons that farmers are always asking [the government]
to make renovations is because they know there are [FO] funds
and they believe it is their money to spend.” Farmers, however,
have little control over when and how the FO funds are spent.
The fund is managed by the DAD, and approvals for spending
and repairs must go through the Divisional Officer at the DAD.
The DAD’s stance is that farmers should not use FO funds for
work they can do themselves, even if  the community would prefer
to first pay someone else to do the work. Because the FO lacks
the authority to compel farmers to engage in unpaid work on road
or infrastructural repairs and the government refuses to authorize
the distribution of funds for system repairs, the infrastructure
deteriorates. As elaborated in the discussion, these disputes have
significant implications for the potential to manage water losses
and efficiency as a means of adaptation.
Why does collective action persist?
In addition to indicating that group-level selection pressures
continue to dominate in minor tank systems in Sri Lanka, our
interview data also provides insight into why such pressures
continue to dominate. When asked why they adhere to seasonal
rules, farmers cited interrelated social and ecological constraints
to individual actions. None mentioned the threat of external
sanctions. Farmers are well aware of the ecological constraints of
irrigated paddy farming and of the individual and group
repercussions of not synchronizing agricultural activities. Each
stage of irrigated paddy cultivation, from land and bund
preparation to harvest, depends on the proper timing of water
release, access to fertilizer, chemicals, seeds, labor, and other
inputs.  
The need for collective water management is a basic fact of life
in reservoir-irrigated agricultural systems; it is essential to
successful yields. In the wet maha season, rules governing water
release provide some flexibility so that the maximum amount of
water can be retained in the tank for the dry yala season. Farmers
consult with each other and agree on the releases based on weather
and crop conditions, and it is therefore important that famers are
in the same stage of cultivation. In the yala season, water release
dates are precisely outlined and followed. Rather than measuring
water use by the unit each farmer consumes, each farmer is
allowed to draw water from the canal for a fixed period of time.
In either season, conflicting water needs are managed according
to the dates and rules outlined in the community contract.
Therefore, if  the community agrees to a rice variety that matures
in 3.5 months, with a planting date of early December, water will
be released based upon the needs for that variety, and those who
start at different times or have chosen different varieties will have
access to water at potentially suboptimal times.  
Planting at the same time as other farmers also reduces
susceptibility to pests. In the minor systems, “especially in paddy
cultivation, farmers discuss with the neighbors and decide when
to apply fertilizer and chemicals and which chemicals to apply
because all the fields are in the same area as tracts, so it is easier
for them to manage the fields in the same manner, otherwise pest
and disease attacks are high” (INT 31). Given the layout of the
tracts, a single farmer cannot protect his fields alone. Therefore,
synchronization of crops and activities helps farmers distribute
the risk of bird, elephant, and insect damage. Ecological pressures
are perceived to be so strong that officials with the authority to
punish farmers for not complying with group practices usually
do not enforce the rules “because nature punishes them” instead
(official).  
Furthermore, these ecological realities have largely been
reinforced by national policy. In contrast to Waring and
Tremblay’s (2016) description of events in Fiji, government
officials recognize importance of collective principles to ensuring
system productivity. Therefore, with the exception of allowing
community members to control their own FO funds, government
officials exert their influence in ways that reinforce collective
management, such as supporting seasonal meetings and contracts
and enforcing the rules established therein.
DISCUSSION
The continued dominance of collective action dynamics described
above has significant implications for the ability of individual
farmers to adapt to climate change independently of their
neighbors. Our findings suggest that in the context of minor
irrigation systems in Sri Lanka, efforts to conserve water, diversify
crops, use alternative or traditional pest management techniques,
change seed varieties, or change planting schedules are likely to
be more effective at the community level because group selection
pressures continue to dominate in these systems. Seasonal
meetings and the drafting of community rules could be an
opportunity for government officials and community members
to work together to craft holistic adaptation action plans (and
coinciding incentives) with the potential for addressing many
adaptation goals, including water conservation and efficiency and
diversifying agricultural crops (Government of Sri Lanka 2010b),
in ways that benefit farmers and contribute to system
sustainability. We elaborate the implications of collective
management for each adaptation measure below. For the sake of
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Table 3. Summary of the relationship between adaptations and community coordination.
 
Adaptation Relationship to community coordination
1. Water conservation Effective water management requires actors to work together at the sluice, canal, and field-levels and
would be nearly impossible without coordination. Adaptations designed to manage water more efficiently
therefore need to be organized at the community level.
2. Crop diversification Because other field crops and paddy require different water regimes, and because water releases must be
coordinated at the community level, successful crop diversification in minor systems is likely to require
community-level coordination.
3. Pest management Farmers have a strong belief  in the need to coordinate pest management; this belief  is consistent with
integrated pest management strategies that target community-level coordination. Future research would be
needed to determine whether traditional pest management strategies require community-level coordination
to be successful.
4. Crop duration Community-level coordination of short- or long-term varieties ensures that farmers will receive water at
critical stages of plant development. Farmers can still choose specific varieties of short-duration seeds on
an individual basis, some of which might be more adaptive than others.
5. Changing planting times Farmers prefer to plant at the same time to ensure the availability of water at critical times in plant
development; farmers can and do make exceptions to this in case of illness or lack of resources (for
instance planting short-duration seeds if  starting late and others are planting long-duration).
6. Water conservation through
infrastructure maintenance
Theoretically, infrastructure maintenance could be managed entirely by the community, entirely by the
government, or through some combination of the two. Whatever the choice, roles and responsibilities need
to be clearly defined, especially with regard to community funds, and agreed upon by both the community
and the government to ensure proper system maintenance and concomitant water conservation.
brevity, we focus only on those adaptations likely to be affected
by the trends, rules, and norms outlined above. The relationship
between each adaptation and community-level coordination is
summarized in Table 3.
Water conservation
Improved water management, including alternate wetting and
drying of paddy, is commonly cited as an important adaptation
to climate change (Bouman et al. 2001, Belder et al. 2004, Belder
et al. 2005, Rejesus et al. 2011). The nature of irrigation practices
in minor irrigation systems means that any adjustments to
watering patterns would likely need to take place at the
community rather than the individual level. The amount of water
released from the tank (and hence not saved for future cultivation)
is determined by how long the sluice gate is left open. If  one farmer
chooses to use less water, the water will still be released
downstream for other farmers to use instead of being saved for a
future season. Only if  all the farmers agree to draw water for a
shorter period is water likely to be kept in the tank for future use.
Likewise, because farmers need to draw water based upon
coordinated water releases, it would be difficult for a single farmer
to adopt alternate wetting and drying of paddy without
coordinating with the entire community to ensure availability of
water at appropriate times. Because effective water management
would be nearly impossible without coordination, we conclude
that any adaptations designed to manage water more efficiently
would need to be organized at the community level. Water
management also influences the need for coordination in several
of the adaptations, described below.
Crop diversification
Likewise, collective water management constraints make it
difficult for farmers to individually engage in crop diversification,
a potentially important adaptive strategy during periods of water
scarcity. Minor tank farmers are only able to grow other field
crops (OFCs) in the maha season on nonirrigated land that is not
subject to the same collective norms or pressures as irrigated
paddy. As one farmer put it, “it is not possible to cultivate OFC
on the tank land. All of the farmers cultivate together, so if  only
he is growing OFC it will cause problems for the management”
(INT 14). Efforts at crop diversification on minor system paddy
lands would therefore first need to address collective water and
pest management constraints or encourage all farmers within the
system to switch to OFCs.
Pest management
The potential for farmers to use traditional pest management
techniques or to rely on integrated pest management are heavily
influenced by the perceived need to coordinate with other farmers.
Farmers who wish to use traditional or nonchemical, integrated
pest control methods risk being the only farmer in the area who
has not used harsh chemicals. Farmers fear being the only ones
to use different techniques because they believe it makes them
more susceptible to pests. Confirming farmers’ fears that using
different pest management practices puts them at greater risk of
pest attack was beyond the scope of this study; nevertheless, the
prevalence of this belief  indicates that any efforts to change
farmers’ pest management practices must either address farmer
concerns regarding outlying practices or be done through the FO
and detailed in the seasonal rules.  
Likewise, efforts to move toward integrated pest management
(IPM) would also need to be organized at the community-level.
The term IPM is often used in different ways (Kogan 1998, Peshin
et al. 2009). It is therefore not a single method or strategy, but
rather an approach to devising such strategies at various scales.
We use it here to refer to decision support systems that help to
select a combination of chemical and nonchemical pest control
strategies based on economic, social, and environmental costs and
benefits (Kogan 1998, Dhawan and Peshin 2009). Although
ideally IPM would require farmers to integrate their pest
management actions for a variety of pests and crops, in many
instances “integration” refers only to integrating multiple
methods to control a single pest or group of pests, with minimal
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community-level coordination (Kogan 1998, Peshin et al. 2009).
Efforts at community-level action would be consistent with the
community level coordination demanded by higher levels of IPM
integration (Kogan 1998).
Crop duration
The use of short-duration crop varieties, which are bred to reduce
the growing season duration and hence water requirements, is
commonly suggested as an adaptation to conserve water.
Although the farmers we spoke to were not always convinced that
the short-duration seeds commonly recommended by the
government were optimal in terms of water usage, pest resistance,
and flavor, our informants indicated that the government already
significantly influences the duration of seeds selected through its
role in drafting seasonal contracts. Unless farmers have
particularly low-lying or wet fields, they prefer to heed
government recommendations to select short-duration seeds
because adhering to recommended planting and maturation
schedules ensures access to water during critical stages of plant
development. However, none of our informants expressed
ecological or social reasons for coordination of the precise
varieties planted if  development and maturation times are similar.
To the extent that short-duration seed varieties succeed in
conserving water, widespread use of short-duration seeds may be
interpreted as an example of government-facilitated collective
adaptation already in place in minor systems. However, because
farmers still have leeway in choosing the precise variety of seeds
to plant, they may still be able to individually adopt specific
climate-adaptive varieties.
Changing planting times
At the collective level, the governance of Sri Lankan irrigation
systems already facilitates changing of planting and harvesting
dates in response to variations in climate and resulting water levels
in the tank. System rules are formulated in advance of the season,
but planting and harvesting dates are determined based upon the
water available in the tank and the arrival of the seasonal rains.
At the individual level, famers have little incentive to deviate from
group rules by planting earlier, harvesting later, or using different
seeds, each of which may result in “natural” penalties. In this case,
institutions in Sri Lanka may already be positively influencing
individual adaptation behavior.
Water conservation through infrastructure maintenance
Improving the condition of the infrastructure is likely to be an
important factor in improving the efficient use of water, and hence
to adapting to increasing water scarcity as predicted under climate
change. Leaking sluices, crumbling canals, and other damaged
infrastructure all contribute to water losses within the system.
Unclear responsibilities for maintenance of the tanks has
contributed to the decline in infrastructure conditions, presenting
a significant barrier to efficient water management and hence to
adaptation.  
Such outcomes are predicted by Ostrom’s design principles, which
suggest that local autonomy to manage a resource is important
to long-term sustainability. Although the government is also
heavily involved in setting and enforcing cultivation rules, those
rules are accepted by the community because of their obvious
contribution to positive outcomes. In the case of FO dues and
infrastructure maintenance, however, the government is not
accountable to the resource users. By refusing to allow the farmers
to use FO money as they see fit, the government creates resistance
to collective maintenance practices and undermines collective
action. FO dues are more like taxes paid to the government than
a community managed fund intended to help the community meet
its own needs and maintain infrastructure. Because both the
government and the famers expect the other actor to eventually
take responsibility for failing infrastructure, the system continues
to erode with significant consequences for farmer livelihoods,
agricultural productivity, and the possibility of more efficient use
of water, as will be required by climate change. Confusion and
conflict over responsibilities for FO funds and system
maintenance will need to be addressed if  minor tanks are to adapt
to climate through more efficient use of water.
Future research
We hypothesize that two forces have helped Sri Lankan minor
tank farmers sustain collective action in the face of rapid change.
First, explicit articulation of and belief  in ecological
interdependence has led to the evolution rather than the
breakdown of collective practices. Second, rather than seeking to
entirely undermine or abolish local control, the government has
been able to coordinate with and influence community processes
for collective action. These conclusions, which are based on in-
depth, qualitative work, form a solid foundation for larger-scale
studies or surveys testing the relationship of individual
adaptations to collective action and the degree to which the
existence of interdependence, belief  in ecological interdependence,
and government support for collective action are individually
correlated with the dominance of group selection pressures. Better
understanding of when individual perceptions, collective
behavior, and ecological constraints align could also help
scientists and policy makers understand where collective
institutions constitute necessary social adaptations to
environmental conditions and where education or policy
incentives might be provided to shift from collective to individual
action or adaptation. Finally, future research is needed to assist
in the design and implementation of successful strategies for
village-level adaptations.
Study limitations
Although our focus on a single village limits the initial
generalizability of results, the findings from this representative
case nevertheless represent a significant contribution to the
literature on multilevel selection because it applies to adaptation.
We demonstrate how an in-depth understanding of multilevel
selection pressures can provide policy makers with valuable
insights on how to target adaptation efforts, while also presenting
hypotheses for future research and testing.  
With respect to generalizability within Sri Lanka, according to
local partners familiar with irrigation systems around the country,
the structure of interactions between community members and
local officials is representative of other minor tank, Sinhalese
villages. Officials from the Department of Agrarian Development
we interviewed in 2017 confirmed that the government takes a
similar approach to interacting with minor-irrigation systems
around the country and understands the ecological importance
of collaboration in small-scale irrigation systems. Likewise,
studies documenting cultural norms within Sri Lankan irrigation
systems suggest that similar cultural norms and beliefs likely exist
in other minor-tank systems (Mosse 1997, 1999). Therefore,
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recognizing that each community will have unique dynamics, we
are confident that the dynamics presented here reflect how many
minor-tank systems with a long history of irrigation are managed
in modern times.
CONCLUSION
The above analysis demonstrates that despite significant changes
in the social, political, and economic conditions, collective
selection pressures continue to dominate decision making in Sri
Lankan minor-tank systems. Widely acknowledged biological
constraints in these minor systems and the social practices that
likely coevolved to manage such constraints continue to compel
individual farmers to adhere to collective cultivation rules and
practices. By all accounts, individual deviation from collective
practices is likely to result in suboptimal results for
nonconforming individuals. Because farmers both experience and
perceive the need to be in sync with one another to protect their
own crops and those of their neighbors, farmers generally adhere
to practices agreed upon in the seasonal meetings and coordinate
application of inputs and harvesting practices with their
neighbors. Individual decisions regarding which seeds to plant,
when to plant, when to release water, and when to harvest are also
heavily influenced by government recommendations and the
community rules consolidated during seasonal meetings. Rather
than undermine collective action, government involvement in
community structures has largely served to reinforce collective
behavior. Responsibility for infrastructure repairs, however, is an
exception, where government interference lacks community buy-
in, resulting in predictable degradation.  
These findings confirm that, as might be expected in a well-
functioning CPR system, efforts to promote adaptation in minor
systems are more likely to succeed if  they target farmer
organizations and the decisions taken in seasonal meetings
instead of individual farmers. Although the need for collective
adaptation may not be surprising in the context of CRP systems,
it stands in contrast to many current adaptation policies and
programs our team has observed over the course of our research,
many of which focus on promoting individual adaptation to
climate change. Existing community rule-making structures and
ties between minor tank communities and government officials
in Sri Lanka may present a unique opportunity to encourage
collective agricultural adaptations. Indeed, the government’s
influence over seed varieties and planting times could be
considered positive adaptation already in place. Additional
research could therefore explore the possibilities for using current
government-community interactions to forward other adaptation
measures such as pest management and alternate wetting and
drying.
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